Files
immich-folio/app/api/map/route.ts
Ralksta 37f7f62157 security: fix pre-auth bypasses and restore Immich 3.x compatibility (#378)
Seven security issues from an audit, plus album pages and the map coming
up empty against Immich 3.x. Verified against a real Immich 3.0.3
instance in a production build.

Security:
- Admin session forgery via a hardcoded 'dev-fallback-secret' signing key
  that bypassed the production AUTH_SECRET guard
- /api/map ignored album passwords and returned working asset tokens;
  rewriting ?size=thumbnail to ?size=original downloaded full-resolution
  originals from protected albums
- Admin login had no rate limit, and the client IP came from a spoofable
  header, so rotating it bypassed every limit in the app
- Raw Immich asset UUIDs were serialized into the RSC payload
- Album tokens never expired server-side; a captured token replayed forever
- Path traversal into the Immich API via an unvalidated album id
- /admin ran with no enforced CSP (only Report-Only reached it)

TRUSTED_PROXIES is replaced by TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS. The old variable
matched proxy IPs against the socket peer address, which self-hosted
Next.js never exposes, so the check could never pass: unset, the limiter
read a spoofable header; set, every request shared one bucket and a single
client could rate-limit the whole site. Migrates automatically.

Immich 3.x: GET /albums/:id no longer embeds assets. Assets now come from
POST /search/metadata with withExif: true — without that flag EXIF is
omitted and grid aspect ratios, the lightbox panel and map markers stay
empty. Drops support for Immich below 3.0, which now logs a warning.

Upgrade: requires Immich 3.0+; set TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS (nginx = 1);
visitors of protected areas and admin sessions must log in once more.

91 unit tests (25 new); the new admin-auth and rate-limit cases were
confirmed to fail against the pre-fix code.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-20 18:57:57 +02:00

108 lines
3.6 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Map data API — returns location-level markers for the map view.
* Each marker represents a unique city/country with averaged GPS coords.
* Cover asset IDs are encrypted for security.
*/
import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server';
import { cookies } from 'next/headers';
import { getConfig } from '@/lib/config';
import { imageUrl } from '@/lib/urls';
import { isAuthenticated } from '@/lib/auth';
import { getMapData } from '@/lib/mapService';
import { checkRateLimit, getClientIp } from '@/lib/rate-limit';
export const dynamic = 'force-dynamic';
/** Map data is cached client-side, so a low limit is plenty. */
const MAP_RPM = 120;
export async function GET(request: NextRequest) {
const ip = getClientIp(request);
const rl = checkRateLimit(`map:${ip}`, MAP_RPM);
if (!rl.success) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'Too many requests' },
{
status: 429,
headers: {
'Retry-After': String(Math.ceil((rl.resetAt - Date.now()) / 1000)),
'X-RateLimit-Limit': '120',
'X-RateLimit-Remaining': '0',
},
},
);
}
const config = getConfig();
if (!config.map) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Map is not enabled' }, { status: 404 });
}
const cookieStore = await cookies();
const getCookie = (name: string) => cookieStore.get(name)?.value;
const locations = await getMapData();
// Filter locations and albums based on auth.
// An album is visible only if BOTH its subpage gate (if any) and its own
// album-level password gate are satisfied. Standalone albums are NOT
// implicitly public — they can carry their own password.
const subpageAuthCache = new Map<string, boolean>();
const albumAuthCache = new Map<string, boolean>();
const isSubpageAllowed = (slug: string): boolean => {
const cached = subpageAuthCache.get(slug);
if (cached !== undefined) return cached;
const result = isAuthenticated(slug, getCookie);
subpageAuthCache.set(slug, result);
return result;
};
const isAlbumAllowed = (albumId: string): boolean => {
const cached = albumAuthCache.get(albumId);
if (cached !== undefined) return cached;
const result = isAuthenticated(albumId, getCookie, 'album');
albumAuthCache.set(albumId, result);
return result;
};
const publicLocations = locations
.map((loc) => {
const allowedAlbums = loc.albums.filter(
(a) => (!a.subpageSlug || isSubpageAllowed(a.subpageSlug)) && isAlbumAllowed(a.id),
);
if (allowedAlbums.length === 0) return null;
// Aggregate over visible albums only, so neither the marker position,
// the photo count, nor the cover asset reveals a protected album.
const photoCount = allowedAlbums.reduce((sum, a) => sum + a.photoCount, 0);
const latSum = allowedAlbums.reduce((sum, a) => sum + a.latSum, 0);
const lngSum = allowedAlbums.reduce((sum, a) => sum + a.lngSum, 0);
return {
city: loc.city,
country: loc.country,
lat: latSum / photoCount,
lng: lngSum / photoCount,
photoCount,
coverUrl: imageUrl(allowedAlbums[0].coverAssetId, 'thumbnail'),
albums: allowedAlbums.map((a) => ({
name: a.name,
url: a.subpageSlug ? `/${a.subpageSlug}/${a.slug}` : `/${a.slug}`,
})),
};
})
.filter((loc) => loc !== null);
return NextResponse.json(publicLocations, {
headers: {
// Private 5-minute browser cache: reduces re-fetches during a session
// while still preventing shared/CDN caching of personalised data.
'Cache-Control': 'private, max-age=300, must-revalidate',
},
});
}