See CHANGELOG.md for the full v0.16.0 entry. --------- Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com> Co-authored-by: ralksta <ralksta@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Ralf <rohlenbo79@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Paul Thies <110185070+ImScheinox@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: lancetm714 <108419425+lancetm714@users.noreply.github.com>
329 lines
12 KiB
TypeScript
329 lines
12 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, afterEach, vi } from 'vitest';
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import { NextRequest } from 'next/server';
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/*
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* getClientIp() reads the hop count straight from the environment, not through
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* getConfig(): the config resolves AUTH_SECRET, which throws in production when
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* none is set — and that took down the install wizard's own API on a container
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* started with no environment at all (#519).
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*/
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let mockHops = 0;
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vi.mock('@/lib/env', () => ({
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env: {
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get TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS() {
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return mockHops;
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},
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},
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}));
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import {
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checkRateLimit,
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getClientIp,
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retryAfterSeconds,
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__resetProxyWarningForTests,
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} from '@/lib/rate-limit';
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function req(headers: Record<string, string>, ip?: string): NextRequest {
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return { ...(ip ? { ip } : {}), headers: new Headers(headers) } as unknown as NextRequest;
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}
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describe('getClientIp with no proxy configured (TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS=0)', () => {
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beforeEach(() => {
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mockHops = 0;
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});
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it('prioritizes request.ip when the platform provides it', () => {
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expect(req({ 'x-real-ip': '5.6.7.8' }, '1.2.3.4')).toBeTruthy();
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expect(getClientIp(req({ 'x-real-ip': '5.6.7.8' }, '1.2.3.4'))).toBe('1.2.3.4');
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});
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it('falls back to headers on a best-effort basis', () => {
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expect(getClientIp(req({ 'x-real-ip': '5.6.7.8' }))).toBe('5.6.7.8');
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expect(getClientIp(req({ 'x-forwarded-for': '9.10.11.12, 13.14.15.16' }))).toBe('9.10.11.12');
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});
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it('returns unknown if no IP information is available at all', () => {
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expect(getClientIp(req({}))).toBe('unknown');
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});
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});
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describe('getClientIp behind one trusted proxy (TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS=1, e.g. nginx)', () => {
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beforeEach(() => {
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mockHops = 1;
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});
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it('takes the rightmost X-Forwarded-For entry, which the proxy appended itself', () => {
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// nginx `$proxy_add_x_forwarded_for` appends the real peer address, so the
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// last entry is authoritative no matter what the client sent.
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expect(getClientIp(req({ 'x-forwarded-for': '203.0.113.9' }))).toBe('203.0.113.9');
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});
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it('ignores client-supplied entries to the left of the appended one', () => {
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// The attacker sends `X-Forwarded-For: 1.1.1.1`; nginx appends their real IP.
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const spoofed = req({ 'x-forwarded-for': '1.1.1.1, 203.0.113.9' });
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expect(getClientIp(spoofed)).toBe('203.0.113.9');
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});
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it('cannot be pinned to an attacker-chosen bucket by a long forged chain', () => {
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const forged = req({ 'x-forwarded-for': '1.1.1.1, 2.2.2.2, 3.3.3.3, 203.0.113.9' });
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expect(getClientIp(forged)).toBe('203.0.113.9');
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});
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it('does not trust a spoofed X-Real-IP over the appended X-Forwarded-For entry', () => {
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const spoofed = req({ 'x-real-ip': '1.1.1.1', 'x-forwarded-for': '9.9.9.9, 203.0.113.9' });
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expect(getClientIp(spoofed)).toBe('203.0.113.9');
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});
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it('accepts X-Real-IP when the proxy sets only that header (nginx overwrites it)', () => {
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expect(getClientIp(req({ 'x-real-ip': '203.0.113.9' }))).toBe('203.0.113.9');
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});
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it('refuses to identify a request that did not traverse the proxy', () => {
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// No proxy headers at all, yet hops are configured: the request reached the
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// app directly. Fall back to unknown rather than to a spoofable value.
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expect(getClientIp(req({}))).toBe('unknown');
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});
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});
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describe('getClientIp behind two trusted proxies (TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS=2)', () => {
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beforeEach(() => {
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mockHops = 2;
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});
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it('skips both proxy hops from the right', () => {
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const r = req({ 'x-forwarded-for': '203.0.113.9, 10.0.0.5' });
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expect(getClientIp(r)).toBe('203.0.113.9');
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});
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it('returns unknown when the chain is shorter than the configured hop count', () => {
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expect(getClientIp(req({ 'x-forwarded-for': '10.0.0.5' }))).toBe('unknown');
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});
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});
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/**
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* Falling back to the shared 'unknown' bucket is correct — trusting a spoofable
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* header would be worse — but silent. Every unidentified request shares one
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* bucket per endpoint, and a 50-photo grid issues ~50 /api/image requests, so
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* the default 1500 rpm is collectively spent by ~30 page loads a minute.
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* Visitors get 429s with nothing in the log naming the cause.
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*/
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describe('diagnosing an unidentifiable client', () => {
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let warn: ReturnType<typeof vi.spyOn>;
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beforeEach(() => {
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__resetProxyWarningForTests();
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warn = vi.spyOn(console, 'warn').mockImplementation(() => {});
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});
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// Without this the spies stack on console.warn across tests and call counts
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// accumulate, which silently turns every assertion below into a false pass
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// or a confusing failure.
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afterEach(() => warn.mockRestore());
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it('warns when the forwarded chain is shorter than the configured hops', () => {
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mockHops = 2;
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expect(getClientIp(req({ 'x-forwarded-for': '203.0.113.9' }))).toBe('unknown');
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expect(warn).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
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const message = String(warn.mock.calls[0][0]);
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expect(message).toContain('TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS is 2');
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expect(message).toContain('1 entry');
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});
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it('warns when neither forwarding header is present', () => {
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mockHops = 1;
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expect(getClientIp(req({}))).toBe('unknown');
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expect(String(warn.mock.calls[0][0])).toContain('neither X-Forwarded-For nor X-Real-IP');
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});
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it('explains why X-Real-IP was not trusted at more than one hop', () => {
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mockHops = 2;
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expect(getClientIp(req({ 'x-real-ip': '203.0.113.9' }))).toBe('unknown');
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expect(String(warn.mock.calls[0][0])).toContain('single hop');
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});
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it('warns once per process, not once per request', () => {
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mockHops = 2;
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for (let i = 0; i < 50; i++) getClientIp(req({}));
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expect(warn).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
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});
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it('stays silent while clients are being identified correctly', () => {
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mockHops = 1;
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expect(getClientIp(req({ 'x-forwarded-for': '203.0.113.9' }))).toBe('203.0.113.9');
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expect(getClientIp(req({ 'x-real-ip': '203.0.113.9' }))).toBe('203.0.113.9');
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expect(warn).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it('stays silent at hops=0, where the shared bucket is expected, not a misconfiguration', () => {
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mockHops = 0;
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expect(getClientIp(req({}))).toBe('unknown');
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expect(warn).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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});
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describe('retryAfterSeconds', () => {
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it('rounds up, so a client never retries before the window closes', () => {
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expect(retryAfterSeconds(Date.now() + 1500)).toBe(2);
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expect(retryAfterSeconds(Date.now() + 30_000)).toBe(30);
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});
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// The reason this is a function rather than an inline Math.ceil. Every route
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// had its own copy, and each shared this edge: a window on the point of
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// expiring gives 0, and `Retry-After: 0` tells the client to retry at once —
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// the opposite of what a 429 means. A past resetAt gives a negative number,
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// which is not valid HTTP at all.
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it('never returns zero or a negative value', () => {
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expect(retryAfterSeconds(Date.now())).toBe(1);
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expect(retryAfterSeconds(Date.now() + 10)).toBe(1);
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expect(retryAfterSeconds(Date.now() - 60_000)).toBe(1);
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});
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});
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describe('checkRateLimit', () => {
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// Use unique IP prefixes per test to avoid cross-contamination
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let testIp: string;
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let counter = 0;
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beforeEach(() => {
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counter++;
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testIp = `test-ip-${counter}-${Date.now()}`;
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});
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it('allows the first request', () => {
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const result = checkRateLimit(testIp, 5);
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expect(result.success).toBe(true);
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expect(result.remaining).toBe(4);
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});
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it('tracks remaining count correctly', () => {
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checkRateLimit(testIp, 5);
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const result = checkRateLimit(testIp, 5);
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expect(result.success).toBe(true);
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expect(result.remaining).toBe(3);
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});
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it('blocks requests exceeding the limit', () => {
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const maxRpm = 3;
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checkRateLimit(testIp, maxRpm); // 1
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checkRateLimit(testIp, maxRpm); // 2
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checkRateLimit(testIp, maxRpm); // 3
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const result = checkRateLimit(testIp, maxRpm); // 4 — blocked
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expect(result.success).toBe(false);
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expect(result.remaining).toBe(0);
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});
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it('tracks separate IPs independently', () => {
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const ip1 = `${testIp}-a`;
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const ip2 = `${testIp}-b`;
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checkRateLimit(ip1, 2);
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checkRateLimit(ip1, 2);
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const blocked = checkRateLimit(ip1, 2);
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expect(blocked.success).toBe(false);
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// ip2 should still be allowed
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const allowed = checkRateLimit(ip2, 2);
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expect(allowed.success).toBe(true);
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expect(allowed.remaining).toBe(1);
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});
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it('returns a future resetAt timestamp', () => {
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const before = Date.now();
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const result = checkRateLimit(testIp, 5);
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expect(result.resetAt).toBeGreaterThan(before);
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// Should be within ~60 seconds from now
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expect(result.resetAt).toBeLessThanOrEqual(before + 61_000);
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});
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it('does not crash when store is at capacity and allows new requests by evicting oldest entries', () => {
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// Fill the store beyond MAX_STORE_ENTRIES (10_000 in prod)
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// by hammering with unique IPs.
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const uniqueIps = Array.from({ length: 10005 }, (_, i) => `evict-test-ip-${i}-${Date.now()}`);
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for (const ip of uniqueIps) {
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checkRateLimit(ip, 5);
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}
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// A brand-new IP must be allowed by evicting the oldest entry
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const freshIp = `evict-fresh-${Date.now()}`;
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const result = checkRateLimit(freshIp, 5);
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expect(result.success).toBe(true);
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expect(result.remaining).toBe(4);
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});
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});
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/**
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* The previous limiter reset its whole budget the moment `expiresAt` (set
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* when the window opened, never advanced) passed. A burst timed around that
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* boundary — most of one window, then most of the next — passed roughly
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* double the documented limit. 10 admin password attempts landed in one
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* second instead of 5 per minute.
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*/
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describe('checkRateLimit is a sliding window, not a fixed one', () => {
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let testIp: string;
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let counter = 0;
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beforeEach(() => {
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counter++;
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testIp = `sliding-ip-${counter}-${Date.now()}`;
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vi.useFakeTimers();
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});
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afterEach(() => vi.useRealTimers());
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it('does not grant a fresh budget the instant a window rolls over', () => {
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const maxRpm = 10;
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for (let i = 0; i < maxRpm; i++) checkRateLimit(testIp, maxRpm);
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expect(checkRateLimit(testIp, maxRpm).success).toBe(false);
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// Exactly one window later: a fixed window resets to a full fresh
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// budget here. The previous window's requests still fully overlap the
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// trailing 60s at this exact instant, so this must still be refused.
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vi.advanceTimersByTime(60_000);
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expect(checkRateLimit(testIp, maxRpm).success).toBe(false);
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});
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it('never lets a boundary-timed burst clear roughly double the limit', () => {
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const maxRpm = 10;
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// Spend the whole budget right at the end of the first window.
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vi.advanceTimersByTime(59_000);
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for (let i = 0; i < maxRpm; i++) checkRateLimit(testIp, maxRpm);
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// Cross into the next window and try to spend the whole budget again,
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// one request per second — a fixed window allows every one of these.
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let allowedInSecondWindow = 0;
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for (let i = 0; i < maxRpm; i++) {
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vi.advanceTimersByTime(1000);
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if (checkRateLimit(testIp, maxRpm).success) allowedInSecondWindow++;
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}
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// A tolerant bound, not an exact one: the point is "nowhere near double",
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// not pinning the estimator's exact rounding.
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expect(allowedInSecondWindow).toBeLessThan(maxRpm);
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});
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it('fully forgets a client after two windows of inactivity', () => {
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const maxRpm = 3;
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for (let i = 0; i < maxRpm; i++) checkRateLimit(testIp, maxRpm);
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expect(checkRateLimit(testIp, maxRpm).success).toBe(false);
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vi.advanceTimersByTime(2 * 60_000 + 1);
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const result = checkRateLimit(testIp, maxRpm);
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expect(result.success).toBe(true);
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expect(result.remaining).toBe(maxRpm - 1);
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});
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it('lets the budget recover gradually as the old window ages out', () => {
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const maxRpm = 10;
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for (let i = 0; i < maxRpm; i++) checkRateLimit(testIp, maxRpm);
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expect(checkRateLimit(testIp, maxRpm).success).toBe(false);
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// Halfway through the next window, roughly half of the previous burst has
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// aged out of the trailing 60s — some budget should have come back.
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vi.advanceTimersByTime(90_000);
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const result = checkRateLimit(testIp, maxRpm);
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expect(result.success).toBe(true);
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});
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});
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