security: implement secure IP retrieval with TRUSTED_PROXIES support (closes #139)

This commit is contained in:
ralksta
2026-04-24 22:14:53 +02:00
parent 3c5715e0b0
commit 771cee517a
6 changed files with 64 additions and 7 deletions

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@@ -22,6 +22,10 @@ CACHE_TTL=300
# Rate limit for image proxy (integer >= 1, requests per minute per IP, default: 120)
# RATE_LIMIT_RPM=120
# Trusted Proxies: Comma-separated list of IP addresses (e.g., from Nginx, Traefik, or Vercel).
# If set, rate limiting will only trust X-Forwarded-For headers from these IPs.
# TRUSTED_PROXIES=127.0.0.1,10.0.0.1
# Secret for signing auth cookies and encrypting asset tokens (string, min 16 chars).
# If not provided, IMMICH_API_KEY will be used as a fallback (not recommended).
# AUTH_SECRET=your-super-long-random-secret-here

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@@ -193,3 +193,26 @@ Your bio text here. Supports full Markdown.
- **Album UUIDs**: In Immich, go to Albums → click an album → the UUID is in the URL bar
- **Asset UUIDs**: Click any photo → the UUID is in the URL bar
## System & Security
Advanced system settings are configured via environment variables in your `.env` or `.env.local` file.
### Rate Limiting
To protect against brute-force attacks and resource exhaustion, Immich Folio includes an in-memory rate limiter.
- `RATE_LIMIT_RPM`: Maximum requests per minute per IP (default: `1500` for general API, `120` for map data).
### Trusted Proxies
If you are running Immich Folio behind a reverse proxy (like Nginx, Traefik, Caddy, or Cloudflare), you should configure trusted proxies to prevent IP spoofing.
- `TRUSTED_PROXIES`: A comma-separated list of IP addresses of your proxies.
Example:
```bash
TRUSTED_PROXIES=127.0.0.1,172.18.0.1
```
When set, the rate limiter will only trust `X-Forwarded-For` and `X-Real-IP` headers if the request directly comes from one of these IPs. If not set, headers are trusted as a best-effort, which is less secure in public-facing environments.

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@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
import crypto from 'crypto';
import { env } from '../env';
import { loadYaml, validateUuid } from './parser';
import { resolveTheme, VALID_LAYOUTS } from './theme';
@@ -16,6 +17,7 @@ export * from './schema';
export * from './theme';
let _config: AppConfig | null = null;
let _fallbackSecret: string | null = null;
/** Converts raw YAML grid overrides into a typed partial GridConfig. */
export function buildSubpageGrid(raw?: {
@@ -54,10 +56,13 @@ export function getConfig(): AppConfig {
'SECURITY ERROR: AUTH_SECRET is not set in production. Please set a long random string as AUTH_SECRET in your .env.',
);
}
if (!_fallbackSecret) {
_fallbackSecret = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
}
console.warn(
'\n⚠️ SECURITY WARNING: AUTH_SECRET is not set. Falling back to IMMICH_API_KEY.\n Please set a long random string as AUTH_SECRET in your .env for better security.\n',
'\n⚠️ SECURITY WARNING: AUTH_SECRET is not set. Generating a temporary random secret for this session.\n Please set a long random string as AUTH_SECRET in your .env for better security.\n',
);
AUTH_SECRET = apiKey;
AUTH_SECRET = _fallbackSecret;
}
const authSecret = AUTH_SECRET;
@@ -93,6 +98,7 @@ export function getConfig(): AppConfig {
albumPasswords: {},
cacheTtl: env.CACHE_TTL * 1000,
rateLimitRpm: env.RATE_LIMIT_RPM,
trustedProxies: env.TRUSTED_PROXIES,
needsSetup: true,
};
return _config;
@@ -268,6 +274,7 @@ export function getConfig(): AppConfig {
albumPasswords,
cacheTtl: env.CACHE_TTL * 1000,
rateLimitRpm: env.RATE_LIMIT_RPM,
trustedProxies: env.TRUSTED_PROXIES,
needsSetup: false,
};
return _config;

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@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ export interface AppConfig {
albumPasswords: Record<string, string>;
cacheTtl: number;
rateLimitRpm: number;
trustedProxies: string[];
needsSetup?: boolean;
}

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@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ export interface Env {
CACHE_TTL: number;
RATE_LIMIT_RPM: number;
AUTH_SECRET?: string;
TRUSTED_PROXIES: string[];
}
function parseEnv(): Env {
@@ -44,6 +45,10 @@ function parseEnv(): Env {
CACHE_TTL: Math.max(0, cacheTtl),
RATE_LIMIT_RPM: Math.max(1, rateLimit),
AUTH_SECRET: process.env.AUTH_SECRET,
TRUSTED_PROXIES: (process.env.TRUSTED_PROXIES || '')
.split(',')
.map((ip) => ip.trim())
.filter((ip) => ip !== ''),
};
}

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@@ -10,15 +10,32 @@
*/
import { NextRequest } from 'next/server';
import { getConfig } from './config';
export function getClientIp(request: NextRequest): string {
// @ts-expect-error - Next.js 15 removed request.ip but hosting platforms like Vercel still populate it
const ip = request.ip as string | undefined;
const config = getConfig();
const directIp = request.ip; // Populated by Next.js if on Vercel/Netlify
const xForwardedFor = request.headers.get('x-forwarded-for');
const xRealIp = request.headers.get('x-real-ip');
// If trusted proxies are configured, only trust headers if the request
// comes from one of those proxies.
if (config.trustedProxies.length > 0) {
if (directIp && config.trustedProxies.includes(directIp)) {
return xRealIp ?? xForwardedFor?.split(',')[0].trim() ?? directIp;
}
// If we have trusted proxies but the direct IP is unknown or untrusted,
// we return the direct IP (if any) and ignore potentially spoofed headers.
return directIp ?? 'unknown';
}
// Fallback for self-hosted environments without explicit trusted proxies:
// We have to trust headers as a best-effort, but this is vulnerable to spoofing.
return (
ip ??
request.headers.get('x-real-ip') ??
request.headers.get('x-forwarded-for')?.split(',')[0].trim() ??
directIp ??
xRealIp ??
xForwardedFor?.split(',')[0].trim() ??
'unknown'
);
}