Seven security issues from an audit, plus album pages and the map coming up empty against Immich 3.x. Verified against a real Immich 3.0.3 instance in a production build. Security: - Admin session forgery via a hardcoded 'dev-fallback-secret' signing key that bypassed the production AUTH_SECRET guard - /api/map ignored album passwords and returned working asset tokens; rewriting ?size=thumbnail to ?size=original downloaded full-resolution originals from protected albums - Admin login had no rate limit, and the client IP came from a spoofable header, so rotating it bypassed every limit in the app - Raw Immich asset UUIDs were serialized into the RSC payload - Album tokens never expired server-side; a captured token replayed forever - Path traversal into the Immich API via an unvalidated album id - /admin ran with no enforced CSP (only Report-Only reached it) TRUSTED_PROXIES is replaced by TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS. The old variable matched proxy IPs against the socket peer address, which self-hosted Next.js never exposes, so the check could never pass: unset, the limiter read a spoofable header; set, every request shared one bucket and a single client could rate-limit the whole site. Migrates automatically. Immich 3.x: GET /albums/:id no longer embeds assets. Assets now come from POST /search/metadata with withExif: true — without that flag EXIF is omitted and grid aspect ratios, the lightbox panel and map markers stay empty. Drops support for Immich below 3.0, which now logs a warning. Upgrade: requires Immich 3.0+; set TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS (nginx = 1); visitors of protected areas and admin sessions must log in once more. 91 unit tests (25 new); the new admin-auth and rate-limit cases were confirmed to fail against the pre-fix code. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
138 lines
5.0 KiB
TypeScript
138 lines
5.0 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest';
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import crypto from 'crypto';
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// next/headers is only used by isAdminAuthenticated(), which we do not exercise here.
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vi.mock('next/headers', () => ({ cookies: async () => ({ get: () => undefined }) }));
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const ADMIN_PASSWORD = 'correct-horse-battery-staple';
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const AUTH_SECRET = 'test-auth-secret-32-chars-long-min';
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vi.mock('../env', () => ({
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env: {
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get AUTH_SECRET() {
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return process.env.__TEST_AUTH_SECRET;
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},
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get ADMIN_PASSWORD() {
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return process.env.__TEST_ADMIN_PASSWORD;
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},
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},
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}));
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/** Import fresh so module-level state cannot leak between cases. */
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async function loadAuth() {
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vi.resetModules();
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return import('../admin/auth');
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}
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function forgeToken(signingKey: Buffer, payload: object): string {
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const data = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(payload)).toString('base64url');
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const sig = crypto.createHmac('sha256', signingKey).update(data).digest('base64url');
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return `${data}.${sig}`;
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}
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beforeEach(() => {
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process.env.__TEST_AUTH_SECRET = AUTH_SECRET;
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process.env.__TEST_ADMIN_PASSWORD = ADMIN_PASSWORD;
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});
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afterEach(() => {
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delete process.env.__TEST_AUTH_SECRET;
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delete process.env.__TEST_ADMIN_PASSWORD;
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vi.unstubAllEnvs();
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});
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describe('admin session tokens', () => {
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it('accepts a token it just issued', async () => {
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const { createAdminToken, verifyAdminToken } = await loadAuth();
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expect(verifyAdminToken(createAdminToken())).toBe(true);
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});
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it('rejects a token forged with the old hardcoded dev fallback secret', async () => {
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const { verifyAdminToken } = await loadAuth();
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// The exact key an attacker could derive from the public source before the fix.
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const legacyKey = crypto.createHash('sha256').update('admin:dev-fallback-secret').digest();
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const forged = forgeToken(legacyKey, {
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role: 'admin',
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iat: Date.now(),
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exp: Date.now() + 60_000,
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});
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expect(verifyAdminToken(forged)).toBe(false);
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});
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it('does not fall back to a guessable secret when AUTH_SECRET is unset in dev', async () => {
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delete process.env.__TEST_AUTH_SECRET;
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const { verifyAdminToken } = await loadAuth();
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const legacyKey = crypto.createHash('sha256').update('admin:dev-fallback-secret').digest();
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const forged = forgeToken(legacyKey, {
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role: 'admin',
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iat: Date.now(),
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exp: Date.now() + 60_000,
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});
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expect(verifyAdminToken(forged)).toBe(false);
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});
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it('throws rather than signing with a guessable secret when AUTH_SECRET is unset in production', async () => {
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delete process.env.__TEST_AUTH_SECRET;
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vi.stubEnv('NODE_ENV', 'production');
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const { createAdminToken } = await loadAuth();
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expect(() => createAdminToken()).toThrow(/AUTH_SECRET/);
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});
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it('returns false (not throw) for a malformed cookie with a short signature', async () => {
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const { verifyAdminToken } = await loadAuth();
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// Pre-fix this hit crypto.timingSafeEqual outside the try block -> RangeError -> HTTP 500.
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expect(() => verifyAdminToken('a.b')).not.toThrow();
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expect(verifyAdminToken('a.b')).toBe(false);
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expect(verifyAdminToken('not-a-token')).toBe(false);
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expect(verifyAdminToken('')).toBe(false);
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});
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it('rejects an expired token', async () => {
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const { verifyAdminToken } = await loadAuth();
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const key = crypto
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.createHash('sha256')
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.update(`admin:${AUTH_SECRET}:${ADMIN_PASSWORD}`)
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.digest();
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const expired = forgeToken(key, { role: 'admin', iat: 0, exp: Date.now() - 1000 });
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expect(verifyAdminToken(expired)).toBe(false);
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});
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it('rejects a validly signed token whose role is not admin', async () => {
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const { verifyAdminToken } = await loadAuth();
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const key = crypto
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.createHash('sha256')
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.update(`admin:${AUTH_SECRET}:${ADMIN_PASSWORD}`)
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.digest();
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const wrongRole = forgeToken(key, { role: 'viewer', iat: 0, exp: Date.now() + 60_000 });
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expect(verifyAdminToken(wrongRole)).toBe(false);
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});
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it('invalidates existing sessions when ADMIN_PASSWORD is rotated', async () => {
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const first = await loadAuth();
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const token = first.createAdminToken();
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expect(first.verifyAdminToken(token)).toBe(true);
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process.env.__TEST_ADMIN_PASSWORD = 'a-brand-new-password';
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const second = await loadAuth();
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expect(second.verifyAdminToken(token)).toBe(false);
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});
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});
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describe('verifyAdminPassword', () => {
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it('accepts the configured password and rejects others', async () => {
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const { verifyAdminPassword } = await loadAuth();
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expect(verifyAdminPassword(ADMIN_PASSWORD)).toBe(true);
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expect(verifyAdminPassword('wrong')).toBe(false);
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expect(verifyAdminPassword(`${ADMIN_PASSWORD}x`)).toBe(false);
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expect(verifyAdminPassword('')).toBe(false);
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});
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it('rejects everything when no ADMIN_PASSWORD is configured', async () => {
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delete process.env.__TEST_ADMIN_PASSWORD;
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const { verifyAdminPassword, isAdminEnabled } = await loadAuth();
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expect(isAdminEnabled()).toBe(false);
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expect(verifyAdminPassword('')).toBe(false);
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expect(verifyAdminPassword('anything')).toBe(false);
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});
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});
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