Seven security issues from an audit, plus album pages and the map coming up empty against Immich 3.x. Verified against a real Immich 3.0.3 instance in a production build. Security: - Admin session forgery via a hardcoded 'dev-fallback-secret' signing key that bypassed the production AUTH_SECRET guard - /api/map ignored album passwords and returned working asset tokens; rewriting ?size=thumbnail to ?size=original downloaded full-resolution originals from protected albums - Admin login had no rate limit, and the client IP came from a spoofable header, so rotating it bypassed every limit in the app - Raw Immich asset UUIDs were serialized into the RSC payload - Album tokens never expired server-side; a captured token replayed forever - Path traversal into the Immich API via an unvalidated album id - /admin ran with no enforced CSP (only Report-Only reached it) TRUSTED_PROXIES is replaced by TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS. The old variable matched proxy IPs against the socket peer address, which self-hosted Next.js never exposes, so the check could never pass: unset, the limiter read a spoofable header; set, every request shared one bucket and a single client could rate-limit the whole site. Migrates automatically. Immich 3.x: GET /albums/:id no longer embeds assets. Assets now come from POST /search/metadata with withExif: true — without that flag EXIF is omitted and grid aspect ratios, the lightbox panel and map markers stay empty. Drops support for Immich below 3.0, which now logs a warning. Upgrade: requires Immich 3.0+; set TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS (nginx = 1); visitors of protected areas and admin sessions must log in once more. 91 unit tests (25 new); the new admin-auth and rate-limit cases were confirmed to fail against the pre-fix code. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
184 lines
6.0 KiB
TypeScript
184 lines
6.0 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Album authentication helpers.
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* Uses HMAC tokens stored in HttpOnly cookies — no database needed.
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*
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* Token = HMAC-SHA256(slug + passwordSecret, authSecret)
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* Cookie = lb_auth_<slug> = <token>
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*/
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import crypto from 'crypto';
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import { getConfig, SubpageConfig } from './config';
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const TOKEN_EXPIRY_HOURS = 24;
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/**
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* Check if a string looks like a legacy bcrypt hash.
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*/
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function isBcryptHash(str: string): boolean {
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return str.startsWith('$2a$') || str.startsWith('$2b$') || str.startsWith('$2y$');
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}
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/**
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* Native SCrypt verify (format: 'scrypt:salt:hash_hex')
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*/
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function verifyScrypt(password: string, stored: string): boolean {
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if (!stored.startsWith('scrypt:')) return false;
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try {
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const [, salt, hashHex] = stored.split(':');
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const key = crypto.scryptSync(password, salt, 64);
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const expectedKey = Buffer.from(hashHex, 'hex');
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if (key.length !== expectedKey.length) return false;
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return crypto.timingSafeEqual(key, expectedKey);
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} catch {
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return false;
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}
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}
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/**
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* Helper to generate an scrypt string to print in logs.
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*/
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function generateScryptHash(password: string): string {
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const salt = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('hex');
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const hash = crypto.scryptSync(password, salt, 64).toString('hex');
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return `scrypt:${salt}:${hash}`;
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}
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function hmac(data: string): string {
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return crypto.createHmac('sha256', getConfig().authSecret).update(data).digest('hex');
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}
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/**
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* Build a session token of the form `<expiryEpochMs>.<hmac>`.
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*
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* The expiry is part of the signed payload, so it cannot be extended by the
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* client. Without it the token was a pure function of (slug, password) and
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* therefore valid forever — the 24h lifetime existed only as the cookie's
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* Max-Age, which the client enforces and an attacker replaying a captured
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* token simply ignores.
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*/
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function authToken(key: string, passwordSecret: string, expiresAt: number): string {
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return `${expiresAt}.${hmac(`${key}:${passwordSecret}:${expiresAt}`)}`;
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}
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function cookieName(key: string, type: 'subpage' | 'album'): string {
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return type === 'subpage' ? `lb_auth_${key}` : `lb_auth_album_${key}`;
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}
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/**
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* Find the SubpageConfig for a given slug.
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*/
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export function findSubpageBySlug(slug: string): SubpageConfig | undefined {
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return getConfig().subpages.find((sp) => sp.slug === slug);
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}
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/**
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* Find the password secret for a given subpage slug or album ID.
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*/
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function findPassword(key: string, type: 'subpage' | 'album'): string | undefined {
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const config = getConfig();
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if (type === 'subpage') {
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return config.subpages.find((sp) => sp.slug === key)?.password;
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}
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return config.albumPasswords[key];
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}
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/**
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* Check if a subpage slug or album ID is password-protected.
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*/
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export function isProtected(key: string, type: 'subpage' | 'album' = 'subpage'): boolean {
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return !!findPassword(key, type);
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}
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/**
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* Validate a password attempt and return a Set-Cookie header value on success.
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* Returns null if the password is wrong.
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*/
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export function authenticate(
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key: string,
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password: string,
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type: 'subpage' | 'album' = 'subpage',
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): string | null {
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const storedPassword = findPassword(key, type);
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if (!storedPassword) return null;
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let isValid = false;
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if (isBcryptHash(storedPassword)) {
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console.error(
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`\n❌ SECURITY ERROR: ${type === 'subpage' ? 'Subpage' : 'Album'} "${key}" is using an outdated bcrypt password hash.\n` +
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` Bcrypt dependency has been removed to reduce bundle size.\n` +
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` Please switch temporarily to plaintext in your gallery.yaml, log in again\n` +
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` to see your new secure "scrypt:..." hash in the logs, and update your file.\n`,
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);
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return null;
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}
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if (storedPassword.startsWith('scrypt:')) {
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isValid = verifyScrypt(password, storedPassword);
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} else {
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// Plaintext fallback (deprecated)
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// Hash both to a fixed length before constant-time comparison to prevent timing and length attacks
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const attemptHash = crypto
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.createHmac('sha256', getConfig().authSecret)
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.update(password)
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.digest();
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const storedHash = crypto
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.createHmac('sha256', getConfig().authSecret)
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.update(storedPassword)
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.digest();
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isValid = crypto.timingSafeEqual(attemptHash, storedHash);
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if (isValid) {
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const recommendedHash = generateScryptHash(storedPassword);
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console.warn(
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`\n⚠️ SECURITY WARNING: ${type === 'subpage' ? 'Subpage' : 'Album'} "${key}" is using a plaintext password in gallery.yaml.\n` +
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` Please replace it with this native secure hash:\n\n ${recommendedHash}\n`,
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);
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}
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}
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if (!isValid) return null;
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const maxAge = TOKEN_EXPIRY_HOURS * 60 * 60;
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const token = authToken(key, storedPassword, Date.now() + maxAge * 1000);
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const secure = process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production' ? '; Secure' : '';
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return `${cookieName(key, type)}=${token}; HttpOnly; Path=/; Max-Age=${maxAge}; SameSite=Strict${secure}`;
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}
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/**
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* Check if the request has a valid auth cookie for the given subpage or album.
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* Works with the cookies() API from Next.js server components.
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*/
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export function isAuthenticated(
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key: string,
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getCookie: (name: string) => string | undefined,
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type: 'subpage' | 'album' = 'subpage',
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): boolean {
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const storedPassword = findPassword(key, type);
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if (!storedPassword) return true; // not protected
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const cookie = getCookie(cookieName(key, type));
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if (!cookie) return false;
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// Legacy tokens (bare HMAC, no expiry) do not parse here and are rejected;
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// the visitor simply re-enters the password.
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const sep = cookie.indexOf('.');
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if (sep === -1) return false;
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const expiresAt = Number(cookie.slice(0, sep));
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if (!Number.isFinite(expiresAt) || expiresAt <= Date.now()) return false;
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const expected = authToken(key, storedPassword, expiresAt);
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// Constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks
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try {
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const a = Buffer.from(cookie, 'utf8');
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const b = Buffer.from(expected, 'utf8');
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if (a.length !== b.length) return false;
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return crypto.timingSafeEqual(a, b);
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} catch {
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return false;
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}
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}
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