import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest'; import crypto from 'crypto'; // next/headers is only used by isAdminAuthenticated(), which we do not exercise here. vi.mock('next/headers', () => ({ cookies: async () => ({ get: () => undefined }) })); const ADMIN_PASSWORD = 'correct-horse-battery-staple'; const AUTH_SECRET = 'test-auth-secret-32-chars-long-min'; vi.mock('../env', () => ({ env: { get AUTH_SECRET() { return process.env.__TEST_AUTH_SECRET; }, get ADMIN_PASSWORD() { return process.env.__TEST_ADMIN_PASSWORD; }, }, })); /** Import fresh so module-level state cannot leak between cases. */ async function loadAuth() { vi.resetModules(); return import('../admin/auth'); } function forgeToken(signingKey: Buffer, payload: object): string { const data = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(payload)).toString('base64url'); const sig = crypto.createHmac('sha256', signingKey).update(data).digest('base64url'); return `${data}.${sig}`; } beforeEach(() => { process.env.__TEST_AUTH_SECRET = AUTH_SECRET; process.env.__TEST_ADMIN_PASSWORD = ADMIN_PASSWORD; }); afterEach(() => { delete process.env.__TEST_AUTH_SECRET; delete process.env.__TEST_ADMIN_PASSWORD; vi.unstubAllEnvs(); }); describe('admin session tokens', () => { it('accepts a token it just issued', async () => { const { createAdminToken, verifyAdminToken } = await loadAuth(); expect(verifyAdminToken(createAdminToken())).toBe(true); }); it('rejects a token forged with the old hardcoded dev fallback secret', async () => { const { verifyAdminToken } = await loadAuth(); // The exact key an attacker could derive from the public source before the fix. const legacyKey = crypto.createHash('sha256').update('admin:dev-fallback-secret').digest(); const forged = forgeToken(legacyKey, { role: 'admin', iat: Date.now(), exp: Date.now() + 60_000, }); expect(verifyAdminToken(forged)).toBe(false); }); it('does not fall back to a guessable secret when AUTH_SECRET is unset in dev', async () => { delete process.env.__TEST_AUTH_SECRET; const { verifyAdminToken } = await loadAuth(); const legacyKey = crypto.createHash('sha256').update('admin:dev-fallback-secret').digest(); const forged = forgeToken(legacyKey, { role: 'admin', iat: Date.now(), exp: Date.now() + 60_000, }); expect(verifyAdminToken(forged)).toBe(false); }); it('throws rather than signing with a guessable secret when AUTH_SECRET is unset in production', async () => { delete process.env.__TEST_AUTH_SECRET; vi.stubEnv('NODE_ENV', 'production'); const { createAdminToken } = await loadAuth(); expect(() => createAdminToken()).toThrow(/AUTH_SECRET/); }); it('returns false (not throw) for a malformed cookie with a short signature', async () => { const { verifyAdminToken } = await loadAuth(); // Pre-fix this hit crypto.timingSafeEqual outside the try block -> RangeError -> HTTP 500. expect(() => verifyAdminToken('a.b')).not.toThrow(); expect(verifyAdminToken('a.b')).toBe(false); expect(verifyAdminToken('not-a-token')).toBe(false); expect(verifyAdminToken('')).toBe(false); }); it('rejects an expired token', async () => { const { verifyAdminToken } = await loadAuth(); const key = crypto .createHash('sha256') .update(`admin:${AUTH_SECRET}:${ADMIN_PASSWORD}`) .digest(); const expired = forgeToken(key, { role: 'admin', iat: 0, exp: Date.now() - 1000 }); expect(verifyAdminToken(expired)).toBe(false); }); it('rejects a validly signed token whose role is not admin', async () => { const { verifyAdminToken } = await loadAuth(); const key = crypto .createHash('sha256') .update(`admin:${AUTH_SECRET}:${ADMIN_PASSWORD}`) .digest(); const wrongRole = forgeToken(key, { role: 'viewer', iat: 0, exp: Date.now() + 60_000 }); expect(verifyAdminToken(wrongRole)).toBe(false); }); it('invalidates existing sessions when ADMIN_PASSWORD is rotated', async () => { const first = await loadAuth(); const token = first.createAdminToken(); expect(first.verifyAdminToken(token)).toBe(true); process.env.__TEST_ADMIN_PASSWORD = 'a-brand-new-password'; const second = await loadAuth(); expect(second.verifyAdminToken(token)).toBe(false); }); }); describe('verifyAdminPassword', () => { it('accepts the configured password and rejects others', async () => { const { verifyAdminPassword } = await loadAuth(); expect(verifyAdminPassword(ADMIN_PASSWORD)).toBe(true); expect(verifyAdminPassword('wrong')).toBe(false); expect(verifyAdminPassword(`${ADMIN_PASSWORD}x`)).toBe(false); expect(verifyAdminPassword('')).toBe(false); }); it('rejects everything when no ADMIN_PASSWORD is configured', async () => { delete process.env.__TEST_ADMIN_PASSWORD; const { verifyAdminPassword, isAdminEnabled } = await loadAuth(); expect(isAdminEnabled()).toBe(false); expect(verifyAdminPassword('')).toBe(false); expect(verifyAdminPassword('anything')).toBe(false); }); // The comparison used to run on the raw strings, so a length mismatch // returned before timingSafeEqual could. That early exit is what leaked the // length of ADMIN_PASSWORD; a wrong password of the *right* length has to be // rejected by the same code path as any other. it('rejects a wrong password of exactly the right length', async () => { const { verifyAdminPassword } = await loadAuth(); const sameLength = 'x'.repeat(ADMIN_PASSWORD.length); expect(sameLength).toHaveLength(ADMIN_PASSWORD.length); expect(sameLength).not.toBe(ADMIN_PASSWORD); expect(verifyAdminPassword(sameLength)).toBe(false); }); it('rejects an oversized attempt without hashing it', async () => { const { verifyAdminPassword, MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH } = await loadAuth(); expect(verifyAdminPassword('x'.repeat(MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH + 1))).toBe(false); }); // A cap that a real passphrase could hit would be a lockout, not a fix. it('still accepts the configured password when it is long', async () => { const { verifyAdminPassword, MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH } = await loadAuth(); expect(ADMIN_PASSWORD.length).toBeLessThanOrEqual(MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH); expect(verifyAdminPassword(ADMIN_PASSWORD)).toBe(true); }); });