Seven security issues from an audit, plus album pages and the map coming
up empty against Immich 3.x. Verified against a real Immich 3.0.3
instance in a production build.
Security:
- Admin session forgery via a hardcoded 'dev-fallback-secret' signing key
that bypassed the production AUTH_SECRET guard
- /api/map ignored album passwords and returned working asset tokens;
rewriting ?size=thumbnail to ?size=original downloaded full-resolution
originals from protected albums
- Admin login had no rate limit, and the client IP came from a spoofable
header, so rotating it bypassed every limit in the app
- Raw Immich asset UUIDs were serialized into the RSC payload
- Album tokens never expired server-side; a captured token replayed forever
- Path traversal into the Immich API via an unvalidated album id
- /admin ran with no enforced CSP (only Report-Only reached it)
TRUSTED_PROXIES is replaced by TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS. The old variable
matched proxy IPs against the socket peer address, which self-hosted
Next.js never exposes, so the check could never pass: unset, the limiter
read a spoofable header; set, every request shared one bucket and a single
client could rate-limit the whole site. Migrates automatically.
Immich 3.x: GET /albums/:id no longer embeds assets. Assets now come from
POST /search/metadata with withExif: true — without that flag EXIF is
omitted and grid aspect ratios, the lightbox panel and map markers stay
empty. Drops support for Immich below 3.0, which now logs a warning.
Upgrade: requires Immich 3.0+; set TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS (nginx = 1);
visitors of protected areas and admin sessions must log in once more.
91 unit tests (25 new); the new admin-auth and rate-limit cases were
confirmed to fail against the pre-fix code.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Sanitized the Content-Type header on image and video proxy routes (`/api/image/*`, `/api/video/*`). The content type is forced to lowercase, validated against a safe prefix (`image/`, `video/`, `audio/`), and restricted to block `svg` and `xml`. Any invalid type falls back to `application/octet-stream`. This prevents an attacker from uploading an SVG file containing a malicious script and triggering a Stored XSS attack via these proxy endpoints, which are excluded from the global CSP.
Co-authored-by: google-labs-jules[bot] <161369871+google-labs-jules[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
