🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix rate limit DoS vulnerability (#136)
Co-authored-by: google-labs-jules[bot] <161369871+google-labs-jules[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ describe('checkRateLimit', () => {
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expect(result.resetAt).toBeLessThanOrEqual(before + 61_000);
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});
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it('does not crash when store is at capacity and prevents rate limit bypasses', () => {
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it('does not crash when store is at capacity and allows new requests by evicting oldest entries', () => {
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// Fill the store beyond MAX_STORE_ENTRIES (10_000 in prod)
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// by hammering with unique IPs.
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const uniqueIps = Array.from({ length: 10005 }, (_, i) => `evict-test-ip-${i}-${Date.now()}`);
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@@ -111,10 +111,10 @@ describe('checkRateLimit', () => {
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checkRateLimit(ip, 5);
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}
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// A brand-new IP must be blocked to prevent spoofing-based cache floods
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// A brand-new IP must be allowed by evicting the oldest entry
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const freshIp = `evict-fresh-${Date.now()}`;
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const result = checkRateLimit(freshIp, 5);
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expect(result.success).toBe(false);
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expect(result.remaining).toBe(0);
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expect(result.success).toBe(true);
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expect(result.remaining).toBe(4);
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});
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});
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