Files
immich-folio/lib/env.ts

78 lines
2.7 KiB
TypeScript
Raw Normal View History

/**
* Environment variables parser.
* Parsed once at startup — all env access should go through this module.
*/
export interface Env {
IMMICH_API_URL: string;
IMMICH_API_KEY: string;
SITE_TITLE: string;
SITE_SUBTITLE: string;
CACHE_TTL: number;
RATE_LIMIT_RPM: number;
AUTH_SECRET?: string;
security: fix pre-auth bypasses and restore Immich 3.x compatibility (#378) Seven security issues from an audit, plus album pages and the map coming up empty against Immich 3.x. Verified against a real Immich 3.0.3 instance in a production build. Security: - Admin session forgery via a hardcoded 'dev-fallback-secret' signing key that bypassed the production AUTH_SECRET guard - /api/map ignored album passwords and returned working asset tokens; rewriting ?size=thumbnail to ?size=original downloaded full-resolution originals from protected albums - Admin login had no rate limit, and the client IP came from a spoofable header, so rotating it bypassed every limit in the app - Raw Immich asset UUIDs were serialized into the RSC payload - Album tokens never expired server-side; a captured token replayed forever - Path traversal into the Immich API via an unvalidated album id - /admin ran with no enforced CSP (only Report-Only reached it) TRUSTED_PROXIES is replaced by TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS. The old variable matched proxy IPs against the socket peer address, which self-hosted Next.js never exposes, so the check could never pass: unset, the limiter read a spoofable header; set, every request shared one bucket and a single client could rate-limit the whole site. Migrates automatically. Immich 3.x: GET /albums/:id no longer embeds assets. Assets now come from POST /search/metadata with withExif: true — without that flag EXIF is omitted and grid aspect ratios, the lightbox panel and map markers stay empty. Drops support for Immich below 3.0, which now logs a warning. Upgrade: requires Immich 3.0+; set TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS (nginx = 1); visitors of protected areas and admin sessions must log in once more. 91 unit tests (25 new); the new admin-auth and rate-limit cases were confirmed to fail against the pre-fix code. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-20 18:57:57 +02:00
TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS: number;
WEBHOOK_SECRET?: string;
ADMIN_PASSWORD?: string;
}
function parseEnv(): Env {
const errors: string[] = [];
const urlRaw = process.env.IMMICH_API_URL;
let apiUrl = '';
if (urlRaw) {
try {
apiUrl = new URL(urlRaw).toString().replace(/\/+$/, '');
} catch {
console.warn('⚠️ IMMICH_API_URL is invalid, falling back to empty string for setup.');
}
}
const apiKey = process.env.IMMICH_API_KEY || '';
const cacheTtlStr = process.env.CACHE_TTL;
const cacheTtl =
cacheTtlStr && !isNaN(parseInt(cacheTtlStr, 10)) ? parseInt(cacheTtlStr, 10) : 300;
const rateLimitStr = process.env.RATE_LIMIT_RPM;
const rateLimit =
rateLimitStr && !isNaN(parseInt(rateLimitStr, 10)) ? parseInt(rateLimitStr, 10) : 1500;
security: fix pre-auth bypasses and restore Immich 3.x compatibility (#378) Seven security issues from an audit, plus album pages and the map coming up empty against Immich 3.x. Verified against a real Immich 3.0.3 instance in a production build. Security: - Admin session forgery via a hardcoded 'dev-fallback-secret' signing key that bypassed the production AUTH_SECRET guard - /api/map ignored album passwords and returned working asset tokens; rewriting ?size=thumbnail to ?size=original downloaded full-resolution originals from protected albums - Admin login had no rate limit, and the client IP came from a spoofable header, so rotating it bypassed every limit in the app - Raw Immich asset UUIDs were serialized into the RSC payload - Album tokens never expired server-side; a captured token replayed forever - Path traversal into the Immich API via an unvalidated album id - /admin ran with no enforced CSP (only Report-Only reached it) TRUSTED_PROXIES is replaced by TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS. The old variable matched proxy IPs against the socket peer address, which self-hosted Next.js never exposes, so the check could never pass: unset, the limiter read a spoofable header; set, every request shared one bucket and a single client could rate-limit the whole site. Migrates automatically. Immich 3.x: GET /albums/:id no longer embeds assets. Assets now come from POST /search/metadata with withExif: true — without that flag EXIF is omitted and grid aspect ratios, the lightbox panel and map markers stay empty. Drops support for Immich below 3.0, which now logs a warning. Upgrade: requires Immich 3.0+; set TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS (nginx = 1); visitors of protected areas and admin sessions must log in once more. 91 unit tests (25 new); the new admin-auth and rate-limit cases were confirmed to fail against the pre-fix code. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-20 18:57:57 +02:00
// Number of reverse proxies in front of the app. Determines how far from the
// right of X-Forwarded-For the real client IP sits. nginx/Traefik/Caddy = 1;
// add 1 for each additional layer (e.g. Cloudflare in front of nginx = 2).
const hopsStr = process.env.TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS;
let trustedProxyHops = hopsStr && !isNaN(parseInt(hopsStr, 10)) ? parseInt(hopsStr, 10) : 0;
// TRUSTED_PROXIES (removed) matched proxy IPs against the socket peer address,
// which self-hosted Next.js never exposes — so it silently disabled per-client
// rate limiting and lumped every visitor into one shared bucket. Migrate the
// common single-proxy case rather than leaving those deploys broken.
if (trustedProxyHops === 0 && process.env.TRUSTED_PROXIES) {
trustedProxyHops = 1;
console.warn(
'\n⚠️ TRUSTED_PROXIES is deprecated and has no effect. Assuming TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS=1.\n' +
' Set TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS explicitly (nginx/Traefik/Caddy = 1) and remove TRUSTED_PROXIES.\n',
);
}
if (trustedProxyHops < 0) trustedProxyHops = 0;
return {
IMMICH_API_URL: apiUrl,
IMMICH_API_KEY: apiKey as string,
SITE_TITLE: process.env.SITE_TITLE || 'Gallery',
SITE_SUBTITLE: process.env.SITE_SUBTITLE || '',
CACHE_TTL: Math.max(0, cacheTtl),
RATE_LIMIT_RPM: Math.max(1, rateLimit),
AUTH_SECRET: process.env.AUTH_SECRET,
security: fix pre-auth bypasses and restore Immich 3.x compatibility (#378) Seven security issues from an audit, plus album pages and the map coming up empty against Immich 3.x. Verified against a real Immich 3.0.3 instance in a production build. Security: - Admin session forgery via a hardcoded 'dev-fallback-secret' signing key that bypassed the production AUTH_SECRET guard - /api/map ignored album passwords and returned working asset tokens; rewriting ?size=thumbnail to ?size=original downloaded full-resolution originals from protected albums - Admin login had no rate limit, and the client IP came from a spoofable header, so rotating it bypassed every limit in the app - Raw Immich asset UUIDs were serialized into the RSC payload - Album tokens never expired server-side; a captured token replayed forever - Path traversal into the Immich API via an unvalidated album id - /admin ran with no enforced CSP (only Report-Only reached it) TRUSTED_PROXIES is replaced by TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS. The old variable matched proxy IPs against the socket peer address, which self-hosted Next.js never exposes, so the check could never pass: unset, the limiter read a spoofable header; set, every request shared one bucket and a single client could rate-limit the whole site. Migrates automatically. Immich 3.x: GET /albums/:id no longer embeds assets. Assets now come from POST /search/metadata with withExif: true — without that flag EXIF is omitted and grid aspect ratios, the lightbox panel and map markers stay empty. Drops support for Immich below 3.0, which now logs a warning. Upgrade: requires Immich 3.0+; set TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS (nginx = 1); visitors of protected areas and admin sessions must log in once more. 91 unit tests (25 new); the new admin-auth and rate-limit cases were confirmed to fail against the pre-fix code. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-20 18:57:57 +02:00
TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS: trustedProxyHops,
WEBHOOK_SECRET: process.env.WEBHOOK_SECRET || undefined,
ADMIN_PASSWORD: process.env.ADMIN_PASSWORD || undefined,
};
}
/** Validated, typed environment variables. */
export const env = parseEnv();