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immich-folio/lib/__tests__/admin-auth.test.ts

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security: fix pre-auth bypasses and restore Immich 3.x compatibility (#378) Seven security issues from an audit, plus album pages and the map coming up empty against Immich 3.x. Verified against a real Immich 3.0.3 instance in a production build. Security: - Admin session forgery via a hardcoded 'dev-fallback-secret' signing key that bypassed the production AUTH_SECRET guard - /api/map ignored album passwords and returned working asset tokens; rewriting ?size=thumbnail to ?size=original downloaded full-resolution originals from protected albums - Admin login had no rate limit, and the client IP came from a spoofable header, so rotating it bypassed every limit in the app - Raw Immich asset UUIDs were serialized into the RSC payload - Album tokens never expired server-side; a captured token replayed forever - Path traversal into the Immich API via an unvalidated album id - /admin ran with no enforced CSP (only Report-Only reached it) TRUSTED_PROXIES is replaced by TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS. The old variable matched proxy IPs against the socket peer address, which self-hosted Next.js never exposes, so the check could never pass: unset, the limiter read a spoofable header; set, every request shared one bucket and a single client could rate-limit the whole site. Migrates automatically. Immich 3.x: GET /albums/:id no longer embeds assets. Assets now come from POST /search/metadata with withExif: true — without that flag EXIF is omitted and grid aspect ratios, the lightbox panel and map markers stay empty. Drops support for Immich below 3.0, which now logs a warning. Upgrade: requires Immich 3.0+; set TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS (nginx = 1); visitors of protected areas and admin sessions must log in once more. 91 unit tests (25 new); the new admin-auth and rate-limit cases were confirmed to fail against the pre-fix code. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-20 18:57:57 +02:00
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest';
import crypto from 'crypto';
// next/headers is only used by isAdminAuthenticated(), which we do not exercise here.
vi.mock('next/headers', () => ({ cookies: async () => ({ get: () => undefined }) }));
const ADMIN_PASSWORD = 'correct-horse-battery-staple';
const AUTH_SECRET = 'test-auth-secret-32-chars-long-min';
vi.mock('../env', () => ({
env: {
get AUTH_SECRET() {
return process.env.__TEST_AUTH_SECRET;
},
get ADMIN_PASSWORD() {
return process.env.__TEST_ADMIN_PASSWORD;
},
},
}));
/** Import fresh so module-level state cannot leak between cases. */
async function loadAuth() {
vi.resetModules();
return import('../admin/auth');
}
function forgeToken(signingKey: Buffer, payload: object): string {
const data = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(payload)).toString('base64url');
const sig = crypto.createHmac('sha256', signingKey).update(data).digest('base64url');
return `${data}.${sig}`;
}
beforeEach(() => {
process.env.__TEST_AUTH_SECRET = AUTH_SECRET;
process.env.__TEST_ADMIN_PASSWORD = ADMIN_PASSWORD;
});
afterEach(() => {
delete process.env.__TEST_AUTH_SECRET;
delete process.env.__TEST_ADMIN_PASSWORD;
vi.unstubAllEnvs();
});
describe('admin session tokens', () => {
it('accepts a token it just issued', async () => {
const { createAdminToken, verifyAdminToken } = await loadAuth();
expect(verifyAdminToken(createAdminToken())).toBe(true);
});
it('rejects a token forged with the old hardcoded dev fallback secret', async () => {
const { verifyAdminToken } = await loadAuth();
// The exact key an attacker could derive from the public source before the fix.
const legacyKey = crypto.createHash('sha256').update('admin:dev-fallback-secret').digest();
const forged = forgeToken(legacyKey, {
role: 'admin',
iat: Date.now(),
exp: Date.now() + 60_000,
});
expect(verifyAdminToken(forged)).toBe(false);
});
it('does not fall back to a guessable secret when AUTH_SECRET is unset in dev', async () => {
delete process.env.__TEST_AUTH_SECRET;
const { verifyAdminToken } = await loadAuth();
const legacyKey = crypto.createHash('sha256').update('admin:dev-fallback-secret').digest();
const forged = forgeToken(legacyKey, {
role: 'admin',
iat: Date.now(),
exp: Date.now() + 60_000,
});
expect(verifyAdminToken(forged)).toBe(false);
});
it('throws rather than signing with a guessable secret when AUTH_SECRET is unset in production', async () => {
delete process.env.__TEST_AUTH_SECRET;
vi.stubEnv('NODE_ENV', 'production');
const { createAdminToken } = await loadAuth();
expect(() => createAdminToken()).toThrow(/AUTH_SECRET/);
});
it('returns false (not throw) for a malformed cookie with a short signature', async () => {
const { verifyAdminToken } = await loadAuth();
// Pre-fix this hit crypto.timingSafeEqual outside the try block -> RangeError -> HTTP 500.
expect(() => verifyAdminToken('a.b')).not.toThrow();
expect(verifyAdminToken('a.b')).toBe(false);
expect(verifyAdminToken('not-a-token')).toBe(false);
expect(verifyAdminToken('')).toBe(false);
});
it('rejects an expired token', async () => {
const { verifyAdminToken } = await loadAuth();
const key = crypto
.createHash('sha256')
.update(`admin:${AUTH_SECRET}:${ADMIN_PASSWORD}`)
.digest();
const expired = forgeToken(key, { role: 'admin', iat: 0, exp: Date.now() - 1000 });
expect(verifyAdminToken(expired)).toBe(false);
});
it('rejects a validly signed token whose role is not admin', async () => {
const { verifyAdminToken } = await loadAuth();
const key = crypto
.createHash('sha256')
.update(`admin:${AUTH_SECRET}:${ADMIN_PASSWORD}`)
.digest();
const wrongRole = forgeToken(key, { role: 'viewer', iat: 0, exp: Date.now() + 60_000 });
expect(verifyAdminToken(wrongRole)).toBe(false);
});
it('invalidates existing sessions when ADMIN_PASSWORD is rotated', async () => {
const first = await loadAuth();
const token = first.createAdminToken();
expect(first.verifyAdminToken(token)).toBe(true);
process.env.__TEST_ADMIN_PASSWORD = 'a-brand-new-password';
const second = await loadAuth();
expect(second.verifyAdminToken(token)).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('verifyAdminPassword', () => {
it('accepts the configured password and rejects others', async () => {
const { verifyAdminPassword } = await loadAuth();
expect(verifyAdminPassword(ADMIN_PASSWORD)).toBe(true);
expect(verifyAdminPassword('wrong')).toBe(false);
expect(verifyAdminPassword(`${ADMIN_PASSWORD}x`)).toBe(false);
expect(verifyAdminPassword('')).toBe(false);
});
it('rejects everything when no ADMIN_PASSWORD is configured', async () => {
delete process.env.__TEST_ADMIN_PASSWORD;
const { verifyAdminPassword, isAdminEnabled } = await loadAuth();
expect(isAdminEnabled()).toBe(false);
expect(verifyAdminPassword('')).toBe(false);
expect(verifyAdminPassword('anything')).toBe(false);
});
security: stop leaking the admin password length through timing (#395) verifyAdminPassword compared the raw strings, so timingSafeEqual could only run once the lengths already matched. The early return on a length mismatch is observable: an attacker who can time login attempts learns how long ADMIN_PASSWORD is, which is exactly the information that makes a brute-force search tractable. The dummy comparison that guarded the mismatch path did not help — it ran on Buffer.alloc(attempt.length), which is attacker-sized and leaves the branch timing intact anyway. HMAC both sides to a fixed 32 bytes first, then compare. Every attempt now takes the same path regardless of length. Keyed with AUTH_SECRET rather than a bare SHA-256 so the intermediate values are useless without the secret, matching how lib/auth.ts already compares subpage passwords. MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH caps an attempt at 1024 characters, rejected in the route before the body reaches the hashing path and again in the library so no caller can bypass it. 1024 is far above any real passphrase — a cap a user could actually hit would be a lockout, not a fix. Supersedes #390 and #388, which fixed the same comparison with an unkeyed digest. The .jules/sentinel.md note the original branch carried is left out: .jules/ is gitignored since cf2e8e6. Adds 3 tests: a wrong password of exactly the right length, an oversized attempt, and that a long configured password still logs in. Verified: 210 unit tests passing (207 before), vitest exit 0, tsc 0 errors, production build exit 0, prettier clean. Co-authored-by: ralksta <ralksta@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-05 12:13:32 +02:00
// The comparison used to run on the raw strings, so a length mismatch
// returned before timingSafeEqual could. That early exit is what leaked the
// length of ADMIN_PASSWORD; a wrong password of the *right* length has to be
// rejected by the same code path as any other.
it('rejects a wrong password of exactly the right length', async () => {
const { verifyAdminPassword } = await loadAuth();
const sameLength = 'x'.repeat(ADMIN_PASSWORD.length);
expect(sameLength).toHaveLength(ADMIN_PASSWORD.length);
expect(sameLength).not.toBe(ADMIN_PASSWORD);
expect(verifyAdminPassword(sameLength)).toBe(false);
});
it('rejects an oversized attempt without hashing it', async () => {
const { verifyAdminPassword, MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH } = await loadAuth();
expect(verifyAdminPassword('x'.repeat(MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH + 1))).toBe(false);
});
// A cap that a real passphrase could hit would be a lockout, not a fix.
it('still accepts the configured password when it is long', async () => {
const { verifyAdminPassword, MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH } = await loadAuth();
expect(ADMIN_PASSWORD.length).toBeLessThanOrEqual(MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH);
expect(verifyAdminPassword(ADMIN_PASSWORD)).toBe(true);
});
security: fix pre-auth bypasses and restore Immich 3.x compatibility (#378) Seven security issues from an audit, plus album pages and the map coming up empty against Immich 3.x. Verified against a real Immich 3.0.3 instance in a production build. Security: - Admin session forgery via a hardcoded 'dev-fallback-secret' signing key that bypassed the production AUTH_SECRET guard - /api/map ignored album passwords and returned working asset tokens; rewriting ?size=thumbnail to ?size=original downloaded full-resolution originals from protected albums - Admin login had no rate limit, and the client IP came from a spoofable header, so rotating it bypassed every limit in the app - Raw Immich asset UUIDs were serialized into the RSC payload - Album tokens never expired server-side; a captured token replayed forever - Path traversal into the Immich API via an unvalidated album id - /admin ran with no enforced CSP (only Report-Only reached it) TRUSTED_PROXIES is replaced by TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS. The old variable matched proxy IPs against the socket peer address, which self-hosted Next.js never exposes, so the check could never pass: unset, the limiter read a spoofable header; set, every request shared one bucket and a single client could rate-limit the whole site. Migrates automatically. Immich 3.x: GET /albums/:id no longer embeds assets. Assets now come from POST /search/metadata with withExif: true — without that flag EXIF is omitted and grid aspect ratios, the lightbox panel and map markers stay empty. Drops support for Immich below 3.0, which now logs a warning. Upgrade: requires Immich 3.0+; set TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS (nginx = 1); visitors of protected areas and admin sessions must log in once more. 91 unit tests (25 new); the new admin-auth and rate-limit cases were confirmed to fail against the pre-fix code. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-20 18:57:57 +02:00
});