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immich-folio/lib/__tests__/auth.test.ts

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security: fix pre-auth bypasses and restore Immich 3.x compatibility (#378) Seven security issues from an audit, plus album pages and the map coming up empty against Immich 3.x. Verified against a real Immich 3.0.3 instance in a production build. Security: - Admin session forgery via a hardcoded 'dev-fallback-secret' signing key that bypassed the production AUTH_SECRET guard - /api/map ignored album passwords and returned working asset tokens; rewriting ?size=thumbnail to ?size=original downloaded full-resolution originals from protected albums - Admin login had no rate limit, and the client IP came from a spoofable header, so rotating it bypassed every limit in the app - Raw Immich asset UUIDs were serialized into the RSC payload - Album tokens never expired server-side; a captured token replayed forever - Path traversal into the Immich API via an unvalidated album id - /admin ran with no enforced CSP (only Report-Only reached it) TRUSTED_PROXIES is replaced by TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS. The old variable matched proxy IPs against the socket peer address, which self-hosted Next.js never exposes, so the check could never pass: unset, the limiter read a spoofable header; set, every request shared one bucket and a single client could rate-limit the whole site. Migrates automatically. Immich 3.x: GET /albums/:id no longer embeds assets. Assets now come from POST /search/metadata with withExif: true — without that flag EXIF is omitted and grid aspect ratios, the lightbox panel and map markers stay empty. Drops support for Immich below 3.0, which now logs a warning. Upgrade: requires Immich 3.0+; set TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS (nginx = 1); visitors of protected areas and admin sessions must log in once more. 91 unit tests (25 new); the new admin-auth and rate-limit cases were confirmed to fail against the pre-fix code. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-20 18:57:57 +02:00
import { describe, it, expect, vi, afterEach } from 'vitest';
// Mock config to provide a predictable API key and subpage config
vi.mock('@/lib/config', () => ({
getConfig: () => ({
immich: { apiKey: 'test-api-key-for-auth-tests' },
authSecret: 'test-auth-secret-32-chars-long-min',
subpages: [
{
name: 'Private',
slug: 'private',
albumIds: ['00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001'],
password: 'secret123',
},
{
name: 'Public',
slug: 'public',
albumIds: ['00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000002'],
// no password
},
],
}),
}));
import { isProtected, authenticate, isAuthenticated, findSubpageBySlug } from '@/lib/auth';
describe('findSubpageBySlug', () => {
it('returns the subpage config for a known slug', () => {
const sp = findSubpageBySlug('private');
expect(sp).toBeDefined();
expect(sp?.name).toBe('Private');
});
it('returns undefined for an unknown slug', () => {
expect(findSubpageBySlug('nonexistent')).toBeUndefined();
});
});
describe('isProtected', () => {
it('returns true for a password-protected subpage', () => {
expect(isProtected('private')).toBe(true);
});
it('returns false for a non-protected subpage', () => {
expect(isProtected('public')).toBe(false);
});
it('returns false for an unknown slug', () => {
expect(isProtected('unknown')).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('authenticate', () => {
it('returns a Set-Cookie string for the correct password', () => {
const cookie = authenticate('private', 'secret123');
expect(cookie).toBeTruthy();
expect(cookie).toContain('lb_auth_private=');
expect(cookie).toContain('HttpOnly');
expect(cookie).toContain('SameSite=Strict');
});
it('returns null for the wrong password', () => {
expect(authenticate('private', 'wrongpass')).toBeNull();
});
it('returns null for a non-protected slug', () => {
expect(authenticate('public', 'anything')).toBeNull();
});
});
describe('isAuthenticated', () => {
it('returns true when a valid cookie is present', () => {
// First authenticate to get the expected token
const cookie = authenticate('private', 'secret123')!;
const token = cookie.split('=')[1].split(';')[0];
const getCookie = (name: string) => (name === 'lb_auth_private' ? token : undefined);
expect(isAuthenticated('private', getCookie)).toBe(true);
});
it('returns false when no cookie is present', () => {
const getCookie = () => undefined;
expect(isAuthenticated('private', getCookie)).toBe(false);
});
it('returns false for an invalid token', () => {
const getCookie = (name: string) => (name === 'lb_auth_private' ? 'badtoken' : undefined);
expect(isAuthenticated('private', getCookie)).toBe(false);
});
it('returns true for non-protected pages (no auth needed)', () => {
const getCookie = () => undefined;
expect(isAuthenticated('public', getCookie)).toBe(true);
});
});
security: fix pre-auth bypasses and restore Immich 3.x compatibility (#378) Seven security issues from an audit, plus album pages and the map coming up empty against Immich 3.x. Verified against a real Immich 3.0.3 instance in a production build. Security: - Admin session forgery via a hardcoded 'dev-fallback-secret' signing key that bypassed the production AUTH_SECRET guard - /api/map ignored album passwords and returned working asset tokens; rewriting ?size=thumbnail to ?size=original downloaded full-resolution originals from protected albums - Admin login had no rate limit, and the client IP came from a spoofable header, so rotating it bypassed every limit in the app - Raw Immich asset UUIDs were serialized into the RSC payload - Album tokens never expired server-side; a captured token replayed forever - Path traversal into the Immich API via an unvalidated album id - /admin ran with no enforced CSP (only Report-Only reached it) TRUSTED_PROXIES is replaced by TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS. The old variable matched proxy IPs against the socket peer address, which self-hosted Next.js never exposes, so the check could never pass: unset, the limiter read a spoofable header; set, every request shared one bucket and a single client could rate-limit the whole site. Migrates automatically. Immich 3.x: GET /albums/:id no longer embeds assets. Assets now come from POST /search/metadata with withExif: true — without that flag EXIF is omitted and grid aspect ratios, the lightbox panel and map markers stay empty. Drops support for Immich below 3.0, which now logs a warning. Upgrade: requires Immich 3.0+; set TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS (nginx = 1); visitors of protected areas and admin sessions must log in once more. 91 unit tests (25 new); the new admin-auth and rate-limit cases were confirmed to fail against the pre-fix code. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-20 18:57:57 +02:00
describe('token expiry', () => {
function tokenFor(slug: string, password: string): string {
return authenticate(slug, password)!.split('=')[1].split(';')[0];
}
afterEach(() => {
vi.useRealTimers();
});
it('rejects a token once its embedded expiry has passed', () => {
const token = tokenFor('private', 'secret123');
const getCookie = (name: string) => (name === 'lb_auth_private' ? token : undefined);
expect(isAuthenticated('private', getCookie)).toBe(true);
// Previously the 24h lifetime lived only in the cookie's Max-Age, so a
// captured token replayed via curl worked forever.
vi.useFakeTimers();
vi.setSystemTime(Date.now() + 25 * 60 * 60 * 1000);
expect(isAuthenticated('private', getCookie)).toBe(false);
});
it('still accepts a token just before it expires', () => {
const token = tokenFor('private', 'secret123');
const getCookie = (name: string) => (name === 'lb_auth_private' ? token : undefined);
vi.useFakeTimers();
vi.setSystemTime(Date.now() + 23 * 60 * 60 * 1000);
expect(isAuthenticated('private', getCookie)).toBe(true);
});
it('rejects a token whose expiry was tampered with', () => {
const token = tokenFor('private', 'secret123');
const [, sig] = token.split('.');
const farFuture = Date.now() + 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
// The expiry is covered by the HMAC, so extending it invalidates the token.
const getCookie = (name: string) =>
name === 'lb_auth_private' ? `${farFuture}.${sig}` : undefined;
expect(isAuthenticated('private', getCookie)).toBe(false);
});
it('rejects malformed and legacy tokens without throwing', () => {
for (const value of ['', '.', 'abc', 'abc.def', `${Date.now() + 1000}.`, 'deadbeef']) {
const getCookie = (name: string) => (name === 'lb_auth_private' ? value : undefined);
expect(() => isAuthenticated('private', getCookie)).not.toThrow();
expect(isAuthenticated('private', getCookie)).toBe(false);
}
});
it('sets a cookie Max-Age consistent with the embedded expiry', () => {
const cookie = authenticate('private', 'secret123')!;
const maxAge = Number(cookie.match(/Max-Age=(\d+)/)![1]);
const exp = Number(cookie.split('=')[1].split(';')[0].split('.')[0]);
expect(Math.abs(exp - (Date.now() + maxAge * 1000))).toBeLessThan(2000);
});
});